Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States
US National Security Policy after 9/11
Published by: Routledge
ISBN: 9780415771436
Publication Date: 2007
Pages: 226
Edition: First Edition
ISBN: 9780415771436
Publication Date: 2007
Pages: 226
Edition: First Edition
Book Summary
This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called ‘rogue states’ and terror groups. James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the ‘three pillars’ of the Bush administration’s national security policy: missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001; pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; homeland security, which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars. Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences. LIST OF READINGS
Introduction: Deterrence in a Changing World
James H. LebovicID: s12159 | 10pp | Copyright Fee: $1.20
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
Viewing the Present through the Past
James H. LebovicID: s12160 | 15pp | Copyright Fee: $1.80
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
On the Offensive against Rogue States: Punishment and Denial Strategies
James H. LebovicID: s12161 | 46pp | Copyright Fee: $5.52
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
A Defensive-Denial Strategy against Rogue States: National Missile Defense
James H. LebovicID: s12162 | 32pp | Copyright Fee: $3.84
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
On the Offensive against Terrorists: Punishment and Denial Strategies
James H. LebovicID: s12163 | 43pp | Copyright Fee: $5.16
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
A Defensive-Denial Strategy against Terrorists: Homeland Security
James H. LebovicID: s12164 | 30pp | Copyright Fee: $3.60
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
Final Thoughts: The Strengths and Limits of Deterrence
James H. LebovicID: s12165 | 6pp | Copyright Fee: $0.72
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11
Appendix
James H. LebovicID: s12166 | 3pp | Copyright Fee: $0.36
Source Title: Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11

